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By Dr. James M. Dorsey
A planned China and Russia-led show of support for Iran at next month’s Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit is likely to be primarily symbolic unless the group
opts to honor the Islamic republic’s bid to be upgraded from observer to full member.
Yet, even a symbolic SCO gesture at its June 9-10 gathering in the Chinese city of
Qingdao that would denounce the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 international nuclear
agreement with Iran and imposition of harsh sanctions could prove tricky.
The meeting is expected to be attended by the presidents of China, Russia, Iran India,
Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. It will come a day after the
leaders of G-7 that groups the United States, the European Union, Japan, Canada, Britain,
France, and Germany are unlikely to find common ground on Iran at their summit in
Quebec.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will presumably not look kindly at solidarity at a
time that the underlying motto of US and Saudi policy towards Iran appears to be isolation
and regime change.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE moreover fear that membership in the SCO, which groups four
Central Asian nations as well as Pakistan and India alongside China and Russia, would
grant Iran a veto over their potential association with the grouping. With Israel and others
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interested in joining the SCO, that may be the reason why the group has so far dragged its
feet on Iranian membership.
China and Russia, like Europe, are signatories of the nuclear agreement, but less
concerned than Britain, France, and Germany about the threat of US sanctions against
their own companies who do business in Iran. At least officially, they have so far not
factored in a potential Saudi and UAE response to efforts to defeat the sanctions and
salvage the agreement.
As a result, Chinese and Russian state-backed companies are maneuvering to profit
from European firms like French oil company Total that are leaving Iran in the belief that
the European Union will not be able to shield them from US retaliation.
Swiss lender Banque de Commerce et de Placements (BCP) said on Tuesday that it had
suspended new transactions with Iran and was winding down Iran-related activities.
Earlier, Germany's second-biggest lender, DZ Bank, said it would halt financial transactions
with Iran in July.
For its part, India, despite being dependent on energy from the Gulf, has vowed to keep
trading with Iran irrespective of the fallout from US sanctions. "India follows only UN
sanctions and not unilateral sanctions by any country," said Indian Foreign Minister
Sushma Swaraj.
Pakistan could find itself in the most difficult situation given its close political, military and
cultural ties to Saudi Arabia and the UAE and its 700-kilometer long border with Iran.
The degree to which SCO members could find themselves between a rock and a hard
place will depend on what strategy the United States and Saudi Arabia adopt in possible
attempts to change the Iranian regime.
So far, the Trump administration appears to see the economic pressure that would fuel
already widespread discontent in Iran as its best bet. That could change however if efforts
by SCO members as well as Europe succeed in countering US sanctions and salvaging the
nuclear deal.
Complicating the debate about how best to confront Iran is the fact that senior aides to
President Donald J. Trump have close ties to a controversial Iranian exile group, the
Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK) or Holy Warriors of the People, seeking the overthrow of the
government in Tehran that also enjoys Saudi support.
The group, believed to be responsible for the killing of several American military personnel
and contractors in Iran in the 1970s, was designated by the U.S. Treasury in 1997 and
delisted in 2012, a year after a host of former US and British officials, came out publicly
in support of the group.
Many of the officials have attended and addressed MEK rallies, allegedly in exchange for
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handsome fees and all-expenses-paid trip. MEK, which first gained recognition for its
opposition to the Shah of Iran, has denied paying for speaking engagements.
Mr. Trump’s national security advisor John Bolton and Richard Giuliani, one of his top
lawyers, were among the speakers.
"The declared policy of the United States of America should be the overthrow of the
mullah’s regime in Iran. Before 2019, we here will celebrate in Tehran," Mr. Bolton told an
MEK rally less than a year before his appointment by Mr. Trump.
"The regime is evil, and it must go. Free Iran," added Mr. Giuliani.
Others who have backed the group include former FBI director Louis Freer, former British
home secretary Lord Waddington, former US Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge,
three former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, two former directors of the CIA, former
commander of NATO Wesley K. Clark, two former U.S. ambassadors to the United
Nations., former national security advisers Fran Townsend and General James Jones, and
93 members of Congress.
US officials said at the time that the group had been delisted after it had renounced
violence and cooperated in closing a paramilitary base in Iraq from where it was operating
since declaring its support in 1983 for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war.
"As far as the MEK is concerned, their guy is in the White House. They’re tied in this
together. John Bolton is the MEK’s guy in the White House," said Joanne Stocker, a
journalist who has tracked the group for almost a decade,
The group also has the backing of Saudi Arabia, which has developed plans and invested
in building blocks for potential covert operations to destabilize Iran.
A Syrian opposition news website reported this week that Saudi Arabia was funding and
providing logistical support to the U.S.-backed Democratic Union Party (PYD), a battle-
hardened Syrian Kurdish group that has proven its mettle in fighting the Islamic State.
The public face of the kingdom’s backing of the MEK is former Saudi intelligence chief and
ex-ambassador to Britain and the United States, Prince Turki al-Faisal.
"Your legitimate struggle against the (Iranian) regime will achieve its goal, sooner or later. I,
too, want the fall of the regime," Prince Turki, echoing the statements by Messrs. Bolton
and Giuliani, told an MEK rally in Paris in 2017.
One-time MEK National Liberation Army commander and security chief, Massoud
Khodabandeh, who turned against the group in the second half of the 1990s, says that "I
personally have brought money and gold from Saudi Arabia to Iraq for the
Mujahideen… It was three trucks of gold… I would say about a ton each."
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A 2012 report by the Library of Congress identified Mr. Khodabandeh and his wife as
Iranian intelligence agents. The report said the couple had agreed to cooperate with the
Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security after it threatened to kill Mr. Khodabandeh’s
brother and confiscate extensive real estate holdings in Tehran owned by his mother.
More recently, MSNBC’s Richard Engel reported that Gulf states had funded construction
of an MEK military base in Albania.
The MEK has denied receiving any foreign assistance, insisting that it is wholly funded
by members and supporters.
The MEK is widely believed to have been responsible for a series of bombings in Iran in
the immediate aftermath of the 1979 toppling of the Shah. that killed scores of post-
revolution leaders.
Dutch media reports suggested last week that an Iranian exile killed in Amsterdam in
2015 was an MEK operative who had been sentenced to death in Iran for bombing a
gathering of officials in Tehran in 1981.
Seventy-three people were killed in the attack, including Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti,
the second most powerful cleric at the time after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, as well as
four ministers and numbers of members of parliament.
It’s unclear what degree of support the MEK enjoys in Iran today with many analysts
convinced that the group lost sympathy when it sided with Iraq against Iran. Groups
associated with the MEK have claimed credit for protests in recent years in the oil-rich
province of Khuzestan, that has a significant ethnic Arab population. Iranian Arab activists
deny the groups’ assertions.
Saudi backing of groups like the MEK and PYD as well as ultra-conservative, anti-Shiite,
anti-Iranian forces in the troubled Pakistani province of Balochistan that borders on Iran
could potentially pose a serious problem for the leaders of the SCO.
Heightened tension in Balochistan could threaten China’s $50 billion-plus infrastructure and
energy investment in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a crown jewel of the
People’s Republic’s Belt and Road initiative.
So far, China is in good company with much of the international community opposed to the
abrogation of the Iranian nuclear agreement and, at least in the word, determined to defeat
US efforts to bring Iran to its knees with sanctions.
Yet, like many in the international community with Europe in the lead, China may find that
putting its money where its mouth is could prove in the final analysis problematic.
Similarly, Russia has much at stake after having forged close cooperation with Saudi
Arabia in managing world oil prices while attempting to ensure that Iran’s presence in
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Syria does not escalate into a war with Israel.
If Europe’s Achilles Heel is obstacles to putting credible mechanisms in place to protect its
companies against US sanctions, China’s weak spot is its ruthless campaign to tame
Islam in China, particularly among Uighurs in the strategic northwest province of Xinjiang.
So far, it has been able to do so with little international response because Saudi Arabia and
other Islamic states have looked the other way. The question is whether an effective
Chinese countering of US sanctions that would significantly weaken the impact on Iran may
prompt Saudi Arabia and others to revisit the issue.
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